Credibility Gap Part 3: Other Factors
Another factor that contributed to the credibility gap was
President Kennedy’s relaxing of the “official military censorship of World War
II and Korea in favor of managed news”[i].
Kennedy was concerned about negative press over censorship.
His caution backfired as a press corps that was used to a
certain amount of wartime censorship got a taste of freedom, so to speak. When
the Saigon government maintained the censorship that Kennedy lifted, it angered
the press corps.
This was about the time when WWII correspondents were
retiring and a new guard of young reporters entered the stage lacking experience
with the military censorship.
I mentioned before that the old guard knew it could cost
lives to reveal sensitive information so they were trusted to hear classified
information and were able to comprehend and formulate informed opinions about
the war in the context of the big picture.
In an attempt to get a scoop, some young reporters released
enough information to get people killed. So the young guard with no tolerance
for military censorship, gradually (and in some instances very rapidly) found
the information gateways becoming clogged with misinformation and doubletalk.
Another communications nightmare was that the new guard was
not trained in military strategy[ii].
Therefore they were confused by military jargon and often dismissed what they
were being told as political doubletalk. Sometimes the doubletalk was
doubletalk, and sometimes it was military or political jargon that was not
understood.
The US military leaders were also aware that information
that showed up on the international wire services was accessed by North Vietnam
and available to the Vietcong as well.
So Kennedy’s “managing news” meant information about ongoing
operations became scarce and non-committal. ... Causing the press to distrust
more and write negatively about it. ... Causing the government spokespersons to
tighten up even more & sometimes lie ... angering the reporters who ...
... “mistrusted the press releases, (that) while often
valid, were extrapolated from ‘double check and confirm’ to reject without
confirmation simply because the report came from the government[iii]”
Well, you get where this is going, a circle of mistrust and
bad feelings spiraling out of control.
But if that’s not bad enough, the press, failing to get
information they needed from official sources, went to sources that often had
one-sided or incomplete information. Skewed conclusions were drawn.
Subjective reporting and editing replaced the objectivity
that is required by the social contract between the press and the people.
The reporters that were looking for the sensational stories
of death and destruction, ignored the stories about the many good things that
were happening:
Major General James C. Smith recalls that “a reporter
followed him around for several days ... but his series was never printed
because it was too complimentary”[iv].
The politicians made mistakes with the press as well. Cosmos
states, “By deliberately understating the scale and costs of the U.S.
commitment in July 1965, President Johnson made inevitable an erosion of
congressional and public trust in his administration as the conflict went on”[v].
Politicians felt the press made mistakes too. “The war was
reported battle by battle,” Nixon counseled. “But little or no sense of the
underlying purpose of the fighting was conveyed. Eventually this contributed to
the impression that we were fighting in military and moral quicksand, rather
than toward an important and worthwhile objective”[vi].
An example of this is found in the coverage of Hamburger
Hill. The media never bothers to mention the millions of tons of weapons and
supplies that were captured and destroyed when Hamburger Hill was taken. They
don't mention that the loss of these supplies delayed the next communist
offensive by 7-8 months.
Nor do they mention that the deep underground 2000 lb-bomb-proof storage bunkers along with their contents were destroyed before
abandoning the Hill. These bunkers could not be blown by B-52s.
They also failed to mention that destroying these
underground storage bunkers & their contents was the main objective of
operation. The bunkers were very labor intensive to build & rebuild. The enemy
troops that were employed rebuilding the bunker had to be diverted from some
other purpose. Again, significantly hindering the communist war effort.
A high enemy body count was the gravy for the operation, not
the objective. The weapons supply depot had to be taken by ground pounders.
Why abandon the base once it was taken? To keep the base may have created another Khe Sanh. Strategists calculated it was less costly to abandon and retake the hill later, if it became necessary, than to spend the effort to hold the hill. It was quite possible the enemy would rebuild elsewhere land we would be holding the hill for nothing.
It is not wise to let your enemy know what your strategies
are. Yet, this simple truth escaped the Vietnam press corps. They complained there
was no strategy, but they could not understand that the military would not
reveal their strategy to the press because they did not want it given to the
enemy.
It’s Wartime Security 101. How could they not know that if
the revealed critical strategic information it could cause American and Allied
casualties?
The Pentagon Papers didn’t help matters much either.
So bottom line the media didn’t trust the government and the
government didn’t trust the media. The problems created by the Credibility Gap
have ripples that are felt even today.
Please email questions and comments to
VietnamWarMyths@gmail.com
[i]
Tallman, G., & McKerns, J. (2000). Press
Mess: David Halberstam, the Buddhist Crisis, and U.S. Policy in Vietnam, 1963. Journalism
& Communication Monographs, 2(3), 109-153. Retrieved from
Communication & Mass Media Complete database, p. 116.
[ii]
Lawrence, John (2002). The Cat From Hue. New York: Public Affairs, p. 51; (Even the
greenest rookie in the Army would know the answer to the question he poses); p.
388 (He doesn’t understand a principle as simple as reinforcements filling the
ranks of the dead in the destroyed unit. JL is one example of ignorance being a
wedge in the communication process. A combination of these various wedges led
to the Credibility Gap).
[iii]
Tallman, G., & McKerns, J. (2000). Press
Mess: David Halberstam, the Buddhist Crisis, and U.S. Policy in Vietnam, 1963. Journalism
& Communication Monographs, 2(3), 109-153, p. 116.
[iv] Kinnard, D., (,2001, pp. 445-456). Vietnam
Reconsidered: An attitudinal Survey of U.S. Army General Officers. Unknown
periodical. Op articles > 543316generalssurveyed.pdf p. 451.
[v]
Cosmos, G. A., (2006). MACV: The Joint Command
in the years of escalation, 1962-1967, (United States Army in Vietnam).
Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, p. 245.
[vi]
Nixon, R. M. (1978), The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. Grosset and Dunlap, New York, p. 350.
